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Abstract
Previous empirical research has shown that the observed inter-sectoral variety in the
rates and form of organisations of innovations is related to differences in the underlying
technological regimes. Further, theoretical models of industry dynamics suggest a
similar relationship between the structural and dynamic properties of the firm
population of an industry and its underlying technological regime. Using productivity
differences between entrants and incumbents as a proxy for the technological regime of
an industry, this paper, on the grounds of a longitudinal firm-level database on the
Dutch manufacturing sector, shows that differences between industries with regard to
their structural and dynamic properties are strongly related to their underlying
technological regimes.
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1. Introduction
This paper deals with the empirical relationship between industrial dynamics and
technological regimes. A technological regime can be defined as a particular
combination of opportunity, appropriability, cumulativeness conditions and properties
of the knowledge base, common to specific activities of innovation and production and
shared by the population of firms undertaking those activities. In the literature on
technological regimes, a distinction is usually made between two major patterns on
innovative activities. The first one, called Schumpeter Mark I (SM-I), is characterised
by key role played by new finns in innovative activities, whereas in the second one,
Schumpeter Mark II (SM-II), this key role is fulfilled by the large and established firms.
The differences between the two regimes are mainly related to differences in the
appropriability, cumulativeness and knowledge conditions. Given these differences,
industries with different underlying technological regimes are likely to differ with
respect to their dynamic and structural properties. For instance, in SM-I industries, we
may expect a turbulent and large population of small firms, low profit rates, and low
entry barriers. SM-II industries might be characterised by a more stable and small
population of large firms, high profit rates, and high entry barriers. The aim of this
paper is to test whether these differences actually exist, by using finn-level data on the
Dutch manufacturing sector.
This paper has the following structure. The next section presents a brief overview of
both theoretical and empirical literature on technological regimes. Section 3 describes
the firm-level data used in this paper. These data will be used to test a number of
hypotheses, related to the presumed differences between industries with different
underlying technological regimes. These hypotheses are formulated in section 4, and
tested in section 5. Section 6 concludes this paper.
22. Technological regimes: the interpretative framework
During his life, Schumpeter held two rather different views of the innovative
process. The first view, expressed in ''The Theory of Economic Development"
(Schumpeter, 1912), emphasises the role of new entrepreneurs in the innovative process.
By introducing new ideas and innovations, new, small firms challenge the incumbent
firms, contributing to what Schumpeter called the process of "creative destruction".
However, the emergence of giant enterprises and industrial research laboratories during
the first half of the twentieth century changed Schumpeter's view of the innovative
process. In "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy" (1942), Schumpeter calls attention
to the key role of large firms as engines of economic progress by accumulating non-
transferable knowledge in specific technological areas. Hence, his second view of the
innovative process could be described as "creative accumulation" (Malerba et al., 1997).
According to Freeman (1982), the main difference with Schumpeter's first view is: '...
the incorporation of endogenous scientific and technical activities conducted by large
firms. There is a strong positive feedback loop from successful innovation to increased
R&D activities setting up a 'virtuous' self-reinforcing circle leading to renewed
impulses to increased market concentration. '
Schumpeter's two views constitute the basis of the two metaphorical archetypes of
technological regimes underlying the analysis of this paper. Before turning to the actual
differences between these regimes, let us first focus on the individual determinants of
technological regimes in general.
To repeat, in line with Breschi et al. (1996) we define a technological regime as a
particular combination of opportunity, appropriability, cumulativeness conditions and
properties of the knowledge base, common to specific activities of innovation and
production and shared by the population of firms undertaking those activities.
Opportunity conditions refer to the likelihood of innovating, given a certain research
effort. This may depend on, for instance, the extent to which a sector can draw from the
knowledge base, the technological advances of its suppliers and customers, and major
scientific advances in universities.
Appropriability conditions reflect the possibilities of protecting innovations from
imitation and of appropriating the profits from an innovation. Possible appropriability
devices I are patents, secrecy, lead times, costs and time required for duplication,
learning curve effects, superior sales efforts, and differential technical efficiency due to
scale economies.
1 See Levin et al. (1984).
3Cumulativeness conditions refer to the extent to which the innovative successes of
individual firms are serially correlated. They are related to the cognitive nature of the
learning process (e.g., learning by doing), and depend on the extent which ' ... today's
technical advances build from and improve upon the technology that was available at
the start of the period, and tomorrow's in tum builds on today's.' (Nelson, 1995).
Finally, with regard to the properties of the knowledge base, Dosi (1988)
distinguishes the following three aspects of knowledge: (1) the level of specificity, (2)
the level of tacitness, and (3) the extent to which the knowledge is publicly available.
The first aspect renects that knowledge can be universal and widely applicable, or more
specific to particular 'ways of doing things'. The second aspect has to do with the extent
to which the knowledge is well articulated, or whether it is more tacit, mainly learned
through practice. The third aspect relates to the fact that some knowledge is open and
public, e.g., scientific and technical publications, whereas other knowledge is more
private, because it is protected by secrecy or patents, or simply because it is tacit
anyway.
In the literature on technological regimes, two opposite archetypes are usually
distinguished. Since opportunity conditions do not necessarily differ between the
regimes2, the differences between them are mainly related to differences in
appropriability, cumulativeness conditions and patterns of access to knowledge. A
Schumpeter Mark I regime is characterised by low appropriability and cumulativeness
conditions, and the knowledge is mainly specific, codified and simple. In a Schumpeter
Mark II regime, these three conditions are reversed: appropriability and cumulativeness
conditions are high, whereas the knowledge is mainly generic, tacit and complex.
The main contribution of the technological regime framework is that it suggests an
explanation for the observed inter-sectoral variety in the rates and forms of organisation
of innovations. Empirical evidence supporting this interpretation can be found in
Malerba et aI. (1995) and Breschi et aI. (1996). By using patent data for four countries
(Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy), Malerba et aI. (1995) construct a group
of indicators of two Schumpeterian patterns of innovative activities. 'A widening pattern
of innovative activity, is related to an innovative base which is continuously enlarging
through the entry of new innovators and the erosion of the competitive and
technological advantages of the established firms in the industry. A deepening pattern
of innovation... is related to the dominance of a few firms which are continuously
innovative through the accumulation over time of technological and innovative
capabilities. ' (Malerba et aI., 1995). Opposite technological regime conditions apply to
these two patterns. The widening pattern is determined by a relative 'ease' of
innovating, low appropriability and low cumulativeness conditions. This facilitates the
continuous entry of new innovators and impedes the persistence of monopolistic
advantages. Deepening patterns are also innuenced by a relative 'ease' of innovating,
but here high appropriability and cumulativeness conditions apply, which facilitates the
2 Both high and low opportunity conditions can underlie one of the regimes (Le., the Schumpeter Mark I
regime).
4accumulation of technological knowledge and allows innovative incumbents to build up
advantages over entrants.
Malerba et aI. (1995) group the empirical proxies into four types: concentration of
innovative activities, size of the innovating firms, change over time in the hierarchy of
innovators, and the relevance of new innovators. After applying these indicators to 33
technological classes, the authors find the following results. First, patterns of innovative
activities differ systematically across technological classes. Second, they observe that
across countries, remarkable similarities emerge in the patterns of innovative activities
for each technological class. In the same technological class the indicators
approximately have the same values across countries. Third, two groups of
technological classes can be defined, in which innovative activities are organised
according to the widening and the deepening patterns of innovative activities. In
general, mechanical and traditional sectors show a widening pattern, whereas chemicals
and electronics show a more deepening pattern. Especially the second result ' ... suggests
strongly that "technological imperatives" and technology-specific factors (closely
linked to technological regimes) playa major role in determining the patterns of
innovative activities... ' (Malerba et aI., 1995).3
Breschi et aI. (1996) estimate the impact of a number of technological regime
variables on patterns of innovation (defined by the specific combination of entry,
stability and concentration of the innovating firms) across industries. They find
considerable evidence for the existence of a relationship between sectoral patterns of
technical change and the nature of the underlying technological regime. Especially the
deepening patterns of innovative activities seem to be related to high degrees of
cumulativeness and appropriability, and high importance of basic sciences relative to
applied sciences. Another interesting conclusion is that widening patterns of innovation
are associated to either very high or very low opportunity conditions. The authors
explain this result by the ambiguous effects of opportunity conditions on concentration.
High levels of opportunity facilitate the entry of new innovative firms, which leads to an
increase in the population of innovators and thus lower concentration levels. But also
low opportunities can have a negative effect on concentration, by impeding the
persistence of major differences in innovative rates among firms.
In conclusion, there is considerable evidence for the hypothesis that a relation
exists between the pattern of innovative activities in a sector and its underlying
technological regime. However, although the previously mentioned authors have
used some demographic indicators, they have only employed these indicators to
the population of firms registered in patent databases. The question that naturally
follows concerns whether a similar relationship exists between the structural and
dynamic properties of the full population of firms in an industry and its
underlying technological regime.
3 Malerba et al. (1996) perform a similar analysis with a different dataset, however the results are
'remarkably consistent'.
5Such a relationship, running in first approximation from the latter to the former, has
indeed been suggested by, e.g., Nelson and Winter (1982), Winter (1984) and Dosi et al.
(1995). In Dosi et al. (1995), technological regimes (together with 'market regimes',
indicating the relative speed at which selection occurs) are used to explain the
empirically observed intersectoral variety in the industrial structures and dynamics. In
the model, each technological regime is defined by the stochastic processes determining
the 'competitiveness' of entrants and incumbents. For instance, in one regime, called
Schumpeter Mark I, the competitiveness of incumbents remains the one they were
endowed with at their birth. Hence, in this regime they never learn, as opposed to the
Schumpeter Mark IT regime. Here, learning by incumbents is highly cumulative: in each
period the competitiveness of incumbents is stochastically augmented by a factor that is
positively related to their relative competitiveness (i.e., vis-a-vis the average
competitiveness of the industry). Thus, in Schumpeter II regimes, 'success breeds
success'. Finally, an Intermediate Regime is defined, in which the competitiveness of
incumbents essentially follows a random walk with a positive drift.
Interestingly, the simulation results show that within a Schumpeter I regime some
intertemporally stable, but lowly concentrated, structures emerge. This is not the case
for the other two regimes that display an irregular long-term cyclicity. Moreover, in a
Schumpeter II regime the average time that the industries spend in highly concentrated
structure is longer than in an Intermediate regime. Hence, disruptions occur less
frequently under Schumpeter II, but they induce major discontinuities when they occur.
With regard to firm size distributions, the simulations show that the less skewed size
distribution appear under Schumpeter I regimes, whereas the most skewed appear under
Schumpeter II.
Besides these comparisons between the three regimes, the experiments by Dosi et al.
(1995) also allow for an analysis of different parameter settings within the regimes.
Three parameters are considered here: the technological opportunities for incumbents,
the technological opportunities for entrants, and the level of market selection. In
general, higher opportunities for incumbents lead to a smaller population of firms,
higher concentration, and lower market turbulence.4 Higher technological opportunities
for entrants lead to exactly opposite results: a higher number of firms, lower
concentration, and higher market turbulence. Finally, a higher level of market selection
has a negative effect on the number of firms, and a positive effect on concentration.s
Hence, higher selective market forces (more 'efficient' markets) '... tend to yield, in
evolutionary environments, more concentrated market structures, rather than more
"perfect" ones in the standard sense.' (Dosi et al., 1995). In conclusion, this model
clearly displays a relationship between the structural and dynamic properties of an
industry and its underlying technological regime.
Since our aim is to establish the same relationship empirically, the present paper is
in a sense the empirical counterpart of Dosi et al. (1995). In section 4, a number of
4 Measured as the sum of the absolute changes in market shares.
5 No clear relationship was found between market selection and turbulence.
6hypotheses will be derived to test whether the relationship between regimes and
industrial properties indeed exists. However, let us begin by describing the data (which
unfortunately restrict the testability of some hypotheses, especially those with regard to
the entry and exit of firms).
3. The data
The Statistics Netherlands manufacturing database that is used here captures all
firms with more than twenty employees (working 15 hours or more weekly) that have
been active in the Dutch manufacturing sector between 1978 and 1992. Furthermore, it
contains 4,415 observations of firms employing less than twenty employees. Some of
these observations represent firms that are initially or ultimately below the threshold of
twenty employees, but also about 600 firms that stay below twenty employees
throughout their presence are included.
In total, there are 84,248 observations representing 10,011 firms, of which 2,838
firms are present throughout the whole period. These continuing firms on average
capture 57.3 and 55.5 % of respectively total manufacturing employment and sales. The
remaining firms are only temporarily present in the dataset; on average they are
observed for 5.5 years. Although these firms enter and exit the database, defining them
as entrants and exiters is not appropriate in most of the cases. For the period from 1986
and onwards, Statistics Netherlands provides information about the specific reasons
why firms enter or exit the database. The majority of the entering and exiting firms
appear or disappear because of passing the threshold of twenty employees. On average,
only 8.9 % and 21.1 % of the firms entering and exiting the database are respectively
greenfield entrants and closedown exiters. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to
distinguish them.
4. Hypotheses
As mentioned in section 2, previous empirical research used data on innovation
activities performed by the firms to study the technological regime of an industry. For
instance, Breschi et al. (1996) found that sectoral patterns of technological change, like
concentration and turbulence of the population of the innovating firms, were related to
the underlying technological regime. Unfortunately, the dataset used here does not
include variables indicating the innovative activities of the firm. Hence, in order to test
whether the technological regimes are related to the structural and dynamic properties of
the industries, we need another criterion for dividing the industries into a SM-I group
and a SM-II group. The classification of industries into "regimes" that follows is an
indirect implication of Breschi et al. (1996) and is also part of the "reduced form"
formalisation in Dosi et al. (1995).
7Given the conditions of the SM-I regime, Le., low levels of appropriability and
cumulativeness and open, codified and relatively simple knowledge, this regime
prevents the persistence of monopolistic advantages and is therefore relatively more
favourable to entrants than to incumbent firms. Conversely, the high levels of
appropriability and cumulativeness conditions and the generic, tacit and complex
knowledge of the SM-II regime allow incumbents to continuously accumulate
knowledge and capabilities and hence create circumstances unfavourable to entering
firms. A meaningful criterion should display this difference between the regimes with
regard to the conditions being more favourable to entrants than to incumbents, or vice
versa. We therefore propose the average labour productivity6 of successful entrants
relative to the average labour productivity of incumbents as a demarcation criterion
between the two regimes, because it reflects the (ex post) difference between them with
respect to the performance or competitiveness of incumbents vis-a.-vis new firms.
Using labour productivity as an indicator for the performance of a firm, we define
an industry as a SM-I industry if in that industry the average productivity of successful
entrants is higher than the average productivity of incumbents. Conversely, an industry
is SM-II if the average productivity of incumbents is higher than the productivity of
successful entrants. According to this criterion, our total sample of 106 industries is
divided in 58 SM-I industries and 48 SM-II industries.
Given the differences in the appropriability, cumulativeness and knowledge
conditions, industries with different underlying technological regimes are likely to differ
with regard to a number of indicators. These expected differences could be classified in
two major categories. The first category consists of static measures, like the firm size
distribution, the second category more reflect the dynamic properties of the industry,
e.g., the process of entry and exit. We will first derive some hypotheses related to inter-
industry differences with respect to both set of variables.
According to Malerba et al. (1995), a typical SM-I industry is characterised by the
presence of many small firms and low entry barriers. Furthermore, the constant inflow
of new entrepreneurs with new ideas, products and processes continuously challenge the
established firms and wipe out their quasi rents associated with previous innovations. In
SM-II industries, this situation is reversed: large firms prevail, entry barriers are high,
and the high profit rates of incumbent firms are persistent. Additionally, Audretsch
(1997) suggests that the degree of capital intensity also shapes the technological
regimes: a routinised technological regime (which resembles a SM-II regime) is more
capital intensive than an entrepreneural technological regime (SM-I regime). These
characterisations allow us to derive the following hypotheses:
6 The average labour productivity is calculated as follows. First, for each firm the average labour
productivity (real value added over number of employees) over its whole observation period is calculated.
Second, per industry the (unweighted) means of the firms' average labour productivity is calculated, both
for the group of continuing firms as well as for successful entrants. A continuing firm is defined as a firm
present in the dataset in 1978 and in 1992, a successful entrant is defined as a firm present in 1992, but
not in 1978.
81. The share of small firms 7 is higher in SM-I industries than in SM-II industries.
2. Concentration levels are lower SM-I industries than in SM-II industries.
3. Entry barriers are lower in SM-I industries than in SM-II industries.
4. Capital intensity is lower in SM-I industries than in SM-II industries.
5. In SM-I industries, profit rates are lower than in SM-II industries.
6. The profit rates of incumbents are lower in SM-I industries than in SM-II industries,
whereas the profit rates of entrants are higher in SM-I industries than in SM-II
industries.
7. In SM-I industries, entrants are more profitable than incumbents, whereas in SM-II
industries incumbents are more profitable than entrants.
This last hypothesis reflects the relative advantage that entrants should have over
incumbents in SM-I industries, and vice versa for SM-II industries. Hence, this
hypothesis tests for differences between entrants and incumbents within each
technological regime. Hypothesis 6, however, compares the differences within the
group of entrants and the group of incumbents between the technological regimes.
Given the patterns of knowledge accumulation in the two regimes, entrants in SM-I
industries should be more successful than entrants in SM-II industries, and vice versa
for incumbents.
With respect to dynamic properties of industries with different underlying
technological regimes, section 2 already mentioned the observed difference in the
stability of the population of innovating firms (see Malerba et aI., 1995). Here, the focus
will be on all firms in the dataset, regardless of their patenting behaviour. Differences in
the stability of this population can be measured by looking at the amount of turnover (in
terms of shifts in market shares) due to entry and exit. Moreover the turbulence within
the group of incumbent firms can be examined here: SM-I industries are expected to
show a less stable population of incumbent firms than SM-II industries. This leads to
the following hypotheses:
8. In SM-I industries, the amount of turnover due to entry and exit rates is higher than in
SM-II industries.
7 The statistical definition shall be presented in section 5.
99. The turbulence within the group of incumbent firms is higher in SM-I industries than
in SM-II industries.
Another potential difference between the two groups of industries is likely to be the
share of entrants and incumbents in the total growth in productivity. Given the nature of
the two regimes, we can expect the contribution of entrants to productivity growth to be
higher in SM-I industries, and the contribution of incumbents to be higher in SM-II
industries. Hence, we can derive the following hypothesis:
10. The contribution of entrants to productivity growth is higher in SM-I industries than
in SM-II industries, and vice versa for incumbents.
Before turning to the next section, in which the hypotheses will be tested, a final
remark should be made about one important limitation of the data. It was mentioned in
section 3 that only firms with more than twenty employees are fully represented in the
data. The consequence of this is that what we call entering and exiting firms are mainly
firms crossing the observation threshold. It might seem awkward then to propose a
number of hypotheses related to the process of entry and exit. However, if for instance
the regime of an industry is favourable to new and small firms, it is likely that it is
easier for these firms to grow and pass the observation threshold than in an industry
with a regime favourable to large and established firms. To put it stronger, excluding
firms with less than twenty employees, even if involving an inevitable censoring of
observations, is not likely to distort neither the classification of industries into the two
regimes, nor their associated characteristics. Therefore, there is reason to believe that if
there are differences between industries with different underlying technological
regimes, these differences will be statistically significant, regardless of whether the firm
observation threshold is set at twenty, at ten, or at zero employees.
5. The hypotheses tested
For every hypothesis, we will calculate the means of the relevant variables for the
two groups of industries, and test whether the differences between the means are in line
with the hypothesis tested and whether the means are significantly different between
SM-I and SM-II industries. In the tables that follow, the specific variables used for
testing the hypothesis can be found in the first column. In the second and third column
the means of these variables are listed for both groups of industries, together with their
standard errors. The rest of the table shows the output of a t-test of the null hypothesis
that the means of the different groups of industries are the same. Because the t-statistic
can only be computed if the variances of the two populations are equal, an F-test is
performed to test the hypothesis that the sample variances are equal. The value of the
F-statistic (the highest sample variance divided by the lowest sample variance) is listed
in the fourth column. Between brackets the corresponding p-values can be found,
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indicating the significance level at which the observed F value is not significant (given
the degrees of freedom).
When this p-value is higher than 0.05, the hypothesis that the sample variances are
equal is accepted. The t-statistic (of the hypothesis that the true means of the different
groups of industries are the same) is then calculated on the basis of a pooled-variance
estimate. If the p-value is lower than 0.05, the hypothesis that the sample variances are
equal is rejected, implying that the t-statistic cannot be computed for the difference in
sample means. In that case, an approximation of t is computed, based on a separate
variance estimate. In column five the value of the t-statistic is listed. The corresponding
p-value can be found between brackets, indicating the probability of the occurrence of a
value larger than t. The lower this p-value, the less likely it is that the true means of the
groups of industries under consideration are the same. An asterisk indicates that t is
approximated.
Hypothesis 1: The share of small firms is higher in SM-I industries than in SM-ll
industries.
The share of small firms, here defined as firms having less than 100 employees, can
be measured as the annual mean of their share in the total population of firms
(MNSMFPRS), or as the annual mean of their share in total industrial sales
(MNSMFRSL). These variables, expressed in percentages, are listed in table 1.
Mean (standard error) Group means T-test
Schumpeter Schumpeter F-statistic T-statistic
Mark 1 Mark 2Variable (p-value) (p-value)
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
MNSMFPRS 71.3 (2.19) 64.5 (3.08) 1.64 (0.08) 1.84 (0.07)
MNSMFRSL 38.0 (2.94) 29.3 (3.39) 1.10 (0.74) 1.94 (0.06)
As the results in table 1 show, there is considerable evidence for this hypothesis: the
share of small firms is significantly higher in SM-I industries.
Hypothesis 2: Concentration levels are lower in SM-I industries than in SM-ll
industries.
To test this hypothesis we calculated for each industry two concentration
measures. The first is the annual mean of the Herfindahl-index (MNHERHIN),
which is the weighted average of the market shares of all firms in the industry (the
market shares are used as the weights). The second is the annual mean of the total
market share of the largest four firms in the industry (MNCR4SHR).
Group means T-test
F-statistic T-statistic
Table 2
Variable
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Mean (standard error)
Schumpeter Schumpeter
Mark I Mark 2 (p-value) (p-value)
MNHERFIN
MNCR4SHR
* approximated
12.1 (1.96)
47.8 (2.71)
13.8 (1.61)
54.4 (3.41)
1.78 (0.04)
1.32 (0.32)
-0.68 (0.50)*
-1.52 (0.13)
As table 2 shows, there are no significant differences between SM-I and SM-II
industries with regard to concentration levels, hence rejecting the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Entry barriers are lower in SM-I industries than in SM-II industries.
Hypothesis 4: Capital intensity is lower in SM-I industries than in SM-II industries.
Advertising intensity, capital intensity, and the minimum efficient scale of an
industry are often considered as important entry barriers. We cannot test for
differences with regard to advertising intensity, since advertising expenditures are
not in our data set. Also, there are no data on the capital stock of firms in our set;
however we can roughly approximate capital intensity by the annual mean of the
ratio of investments to sales (MNRLINV). Finally, a proxy for the minimum
efficient scale is the median plant size of the industry (MEDSIZE).
Group means T-test
F-statistic T-statistic
Table 3
Variable
Mean (standard error)
Schumpeter Schumpeter
Mark 1 Mark 2 (p-value) (p-value)
MNRLINV
MEDSIZE
SURVRATE
* approximated
5.89 (0.27)
68.6 (7.01)
73.1 (2.71)
6.78 (0.39)
86.3 (8.85)
65.5 (3.79)
1.72 (0.05)
1.32 (0.31)
1.62 (0.08)
-1.91 (0.06)
-1.59 (0.11)
1.67 (0.10)
As table 3 shows, in SM-I industries "capital intensity" (as proxied here) indeed
appears to be lower than in SM-II industries. Further, there is some weak evidence that
the median size of firms in SM-I industries is lower than in SM-II industries. Hence, the
evidence for hypothesis 3 is rather strong when ex ante measures of entry barriers are
applied. By using the proxy for capital intensity as an indicator for entry barriers,
hypothesis 4 was automatically tested as well, and accepted. We also measured entry
barriers ex post by calculating for each industry the number of successful entrants (firms
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not present in 1978, but still present in 1992) relative to the total number of entrants
over the whole period (SURVRATE). Measured in this way, entry barriers are higher in
SM-II industries than in SM-I industries at the 10 percent significance level.
Hypothesis 5: Profit rates in SM-I industries are lower than in SM-II industries.
Hypothesis 6: The profit rates of incumbents are lower in SM-I industries than in SM-II
industries, whereas the profit rates ofentrants are higher in SM-I industries than in SM-
II industries.
Hypothesis 7: In SM-I industries, entrants are more profitable than incumbents,
whereas in SM-II industries incumbents are more profitable than entrants.
For measuring profitability, we use the annual mean of the ratio of gross profit to
sales. For testing hypothesis 5, the mean of this ratio of all firms in the industry is
calculated (MNRLPROF). For hypotheses 6 and 7, we use respectively the mean of this
ratio of all continuing firms (INCRPROF), and of all successful entrants (ENTRPROF)
in each industry. The results, expressed in percentages, are listed in the table 4.
Group means T-test
F-statistic T-statistic
Table 4
Variable
Mean (standard error)
Schumpeter Schumpeter
Mark 1 Mark 2 (p-value) (p-value)
MNRLPROF
INCRPROF
ENTRPROF
* approximated
8.13 (0040)
8.51 (0.44)
12.5 (1.00)
9.72 (0.49)
10.5 (0.79)
7.82 (2.18)
1.28 (0.37)
2.64 «0.01)
3.82 «0.01)
-2.55 (0.01)
-2.23 (0.02)*
1.97 (0.05)*
Hypothesis 5 is accepted: the average profitability in SM-I industries is significantly
lower than in SM-II industries. The same applies to hypothesis 6: profit margins of
incumbents are significantly lower in SM-I industries than in SM-II industries, while
profit margins of entrants are significantly higher in SM-I industries than in SM-II
industries. Note, however, that compared to the other values, the standard error of the
mean of average profitability of successful entrants in SM-II industries is remarkably
high, hence weakening the evidence for hypothesis 7. Within the group of SM-I
industries, entrants are significantly more profitable than incumbent firms, which is
confirmed by a paired groups t test. For each industry, the difference between
INCRPROF and ENTRPROF was calculated. Subsequently, for SM-I and SM-II
industries the mean of these differences was computed. For SM-I industries, the
hypothesis that the true means of these differences are equal to zero was rejected (the t-
value is equal to -3.79). However, for SM-II industries the same hypothesis could not be
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rejected, given the t-value of 1.14. Hence, incumbents do not appear to be significantly
more profitable than entrants in SM-ll industries.
Hypothesis 8: In SM-I industries, the amount of turnover due to entry and exit rates is
higher than in SM-II industries.
There are two ways of measuring the magnitude of the process of entry and exit.
The first one simply measures annual firm entry and exit rates, by counting the
number of entering and exiting firms and dividing them by the total number of
firms active in the industry. Accordingly, the share of sales of entering and exiting
firms in total industrial sales can be calculated for each year in order to measure
annual sales entry and exit rates. In the table 5, the industrial means of the annual
firm entry and exit rates (ENTRYRT and EXITRT), as well as the industrial
means of annual sales entry and exit rates (ENSALERT and EXSALERT), all in
percentages, are listed in table 5.
Group means T-test
F-statistic T-statistic
Table 5 Mean (standard error)
Schumpeter Schumpeter
Mark 1 Mark 2Variable (p-value) (p-value)
, .
ENTRYRT 8.72 (0.62) 8.36 (0.59) 1.32 (0.32) 0.41 (0.68)
EXITRT 8.40 (0.61) 8.22 (0.51) 1.74 (0.05) 0.22 (0.83)
ENSALERT 4.57 (0.38) 3.45 (0.40) 1.09 (0.77) 2.00 (0.05)
EXSALERT 4.71 (0.46) 3.38 (0.34) 2.21 (0.01) 2.26 (0.02)
The second way is to measure cumulative entry and exit rates. These measures
reflect the significance of entry and exit in the long run. The cumulative entry rate
is the share of entrants in the total number of firms (ENTRTCM) or total sales
(SLENRTCM) at the end of a given period, i.e., 1992. The cumulative exit rate is
the share of exiting firms in the total number of firms (EXTRTCM) or total sales
(SLEXRTCM) at the beginning of the period, i.e., 1978. The means of these
variables, in percentages, are listed in table 6.
Table 6 Mean (standard error) Group means T-test
Schumpeter Schumpeter F-statistic T-statistic
Variable Mark 1 Mark 2 (p-value) (p-value)
ENTRTCM 47.7 (2.14) 41.7 (2.89) 1.47 (0.16) 1.68 (0.09)
EXRTCM 48.3 (1.67) 42.6 (2.46) 1.64 (0.08) 1.78 (0.08)
SLENRTCM 34.6 (2.30) 23.5 (2.98) 1.37 (0.26) 3.00 «0.01)
Group means T-test
F-statistic T-statistic
Table 6
Variable
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Mean (standard error)
Schumpeter Schumpeter
Mark 1 Mark 2 (p-value) (p-value)
SLEXRTCM 36.2 (2.92) 27.1 (3.15) 1.03 (0.94) 2.12 (0.04)
Annual firm entry and exit rates do not differ significantly between the two groups
of industries. However, annual sales entry and exit rates are indeed higher in SM-I
industries than in SM-II industries. With respect to cumulative entry and exit
rates, the evidence is stronger. Both measures differ between the two groups at the
10 percent significance level. The cumulative entry and exit sales rates are
different between SM-I and SM-II industries at the 5 percent significance level.
Therefore, both for the short and the long term perspective there is considerable
evidence that the amount of turnover due to entry and exit rates is higher in SM-I
industries than in SM-II industries.
Hypothesis 9: The turbulence within the group of incumbent firms is higher in SM-I
industries than in SM-II industries.
Two measures are proposed here. The first one (SLSRTURB) measures the short
run turbulence within the group of incumbent firms. For each year and for each
continuing firm (i.e., firms present in 1978 and 1992), the absolute change in market
share is calculated. Next, for each industry the sum of the absolute changes in market
shares is computed for each year. Finally, the annual mean of the sum of changes is
calculated for each industry. The second measure (SLLRTURB) measures the long run
turbulence. For each continuing firm, the absolute change in market share between 1978
and 1992 is calculated. The long run turbulence of an industry is then equal to the sum
of absolute market share changes of the continuing firms within that industry. The
results are listed in table 7.
Group means T-test
F-statistic T-statistic
Table 7
Variable
Mean (standard error)
Schumpeter Schumpeter
Mark 1 Mark 2 (p-value) (p-value)
SLSRTURB
SLLRTURB
* approximated
13.8 (0.93)
26.2 (1.45)
10.8 (0.47)
25.3 (1.71)
4.70 «0.01)
1.15 (0.61)
2.93 «0.01)*
0.40 (0.69)
Only when measured in the short run, the amount of turnover is significantly higher
in SM-I industries than in SM-II industries. The long run measures of turbulence are
approximately equal for the two groups of industries.
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Hypothesis 10: The contribution of entrants to productivity growth is higher in SM-I
industries than in SM-II industries, and vice versa for incumbents.
Baldwin (1995) provides an elegant way of calculating the contribution of entering,
exiting and continuing firms to the total productivity growth of an industry in a given
period. The total growth of labour productivity (TOT) between 1978 and 1992 can be
expressed in the following way:
TOT = SHEN92 x (APEN92 - APEX78) + SHIN92 x (APC92 - APC78)
+ (SHIN92 - SHIN78) x (APC78 - APEX78)
where SHEN92 is the labour shareR of entrants in 1992, SHIN78 and SHIN92 the labour
shares of continuing firms in 1978 and 1992. APEN92 and APEX78 denote the real
value added per worker for respectively entrants in 1992 and exiters in 1978. Finally,
APC78 and APC92 are the real value added per worker for continuing firms in
respectively 1978 and 1992.
In this expression, assuming that the share of continuing firms in total industrial
employment is held constant, the first term (DIFENEX) captures the change due to the
difference in productivity between entrants and exiters and the second term
(PROGCONT) reflects the growth in productivity due to progress in continuing firms.
The effect of actual share changes is captured by the third term (SHARECHS).
For each industry with positive productivity growth9 , we calculated the three terms
and divided them by total productivity growth in order to get their shares in total
productivity growth. In table 8 the mean values for the three terms are listed (standard
error of the mean in parentheses), for both groups of industries.
Group means T-test
F-statistic T-statistic
Table 8 Mean (standard error)
Schumpeter Schumpeter
Mark 1 Mark 2Variable (p-value) (p-value)
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
DIFENEX 60.7 (12.2) 19.4 (4.45) 9.81 «0.0l) 3.17 «0.01)*
PROGCONT 42.3 (9.42) 76.2 (5.78) 3.45 «0.0l) -3.07 (0.04)*
SHARECHS -3.03 (7.10) 4.35 (4.38) 3.41 «0.01) -0.88 (0.38)*
* approximated
• The labour share of, e.g., entrants in 1992 is equal to the number of workers employed by successful
entrants in 1992 di vided by the total number of employees in the industry in 1992.
9 This restriction ruled out 6 SM-I industries and 8 SM-II industries, but this had only little impact on the
outcomes.
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If we compare the difference in the contribution of entrants and incumbents between
the two regimes, we find support for hypothesis 10. The contribution to total
productivity growth of entrants is significantly higher in SM-I industries than in SM-II
industries, and conversely for SM-II as compared to SM-I industries. The results also
indicate that within the group of SM-I industries, the contributions by entrants and
continuing firms to total productivity growth are not significantly different. This is
confirmed by a paired groups t test, similar to the one applied at testing hypothesis 5 (t-
value equal to 0.89). However, within the group of SM-II industries, the contribution by
entering firms is much lower than the contribution made by incumbents (t-value equal
to -6.08).
6. Conclusions
The main conclusion from the analysis of the previous section is that the results
indeed suggest that the structural and dynamic properties of the industries are strongly
related to their underlying technological regimes. Obviously, the two groups of
industries show considerable differences with regard to most of the selected variables,
which in all cases have the right sign, and thus corroborate the hypotheses. For only a
few variables the differences are not significant.
With regard to firm size distribution, we have found considerable evidence for the
hypothesis that the share of small firms is higher in SM-I industries than in SM-II
industries. However, no significant differences were found for the concentration levels
of industrial sales. The two groups of industries showed a slight difference with respect
to the median firm size; however, using a proxy for capital intensity as an alternative
measure for entry barriers provides some stronger, although circumstantial evidence that
entry barriers are higher in SM-II industries than in SM-I industries. Further, overall
profitability is significantly higher in SM-II industries, and incumbent firms in SM-II
industries are more profitable than incumbents in SM-I industries, whereas the opposite
holds for entrants. Within SM-I industries, entrants are more profitable than incumbents.
Within SM-II industries however, incumbents are not significantly more profitable than
entrants.
With regard to the dynamic measures, we have found that both short run as long run
indicators show that the amount of turnover due to entry and exit is higher in SM-I
industries than in SM-II industries. Interestingly, however, this goes together with the
evidence that the annual firm entry and exit rates did not differ significantly between the
two groups of industries.
The measures of turbulence within the group of incumbent firms showed some
mixed results. This variable was only significantly different when measured as year to
year changes. If the full period was taken into account, the turbulence within the group
of incumbents is approximately the same for SM-I and SM-II industries. Finally, the
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contribution of entrants to total productivity growth is higher in SM-I industries than in
SM-I1 industries, whereas incumbents contribute much more to total growth of
productivity in SM-II than in SM-I industries.
These results show that technological regimes explain to a considerable extent
differences between industries with regard to their structural and dynamic properties.
Admittedly, the caveat here is that we used the average productivity of successful
entrants relative to the productivity of incumbents in an industry as a proxy for its
underlying technological regime. But given the nature of the two stylised technological
regimes considered here, the (ex post) performance of entrants relative to incumbents is
reasonable proxy for assessing the relative favourable conditions of a regime towards
small and new firms, or towards large and established firms in the opposite regime.
Further analyses, directly using proxies for the actual opportunity, appropriability,
cumulativeness and conditions of knowledge accumulation, would certainly provide a
stronger basis for testing whether technological regimes explain the observed
differences between industries. However, the results of the present analysis are in our
view strong enough to support to '... interpretations leaning toward an evolutionary
approach [which] emphasize sector/technology-specific patterns and invariances in the
way agents learn... as determinants of both structures and dynamics.' (Dosi et aI.,
1997). Obviously, many open questions remain, but we hope that the analysis presented
here has provided more evidence on the links between technological regimes, patterns
of innovation and industrial dynamics.
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